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In Praise of the Struggle for Diversity on
Law School Faculties
Randall Kennedyt
The central purpose of this Essay is to praise, encourage, and,
at the same time, challenge, an important development in American education: the movement to open the faculties of institutions
of higher education to persons associated with historically disadvantaged groups. Although the individuals and organizations that
constitute this struggle vary considerably in their goals and tactics,
they all march under the banner of what has quickly become a key
word in the lexicon of contemporary politics. That word is "diversity." I speak as a participant-observer in the diversity movement
and will focus mainly on the aspects of that movement that pertain
to race-the social demarcation I have studied most-and to law
school faculties-the sector of university life with which I am most
familiar.
I

The diversity movement is an amalgam of students, professors, administrators and others who are intensely dissatisfied with
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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the situation that presently obtains at many law schools, a situation in which members of historically deprived groups are either
absent completely or present only in strikingly small numbers. 1
The diversity movement seeks, at base, to widen opportunities for
people of color to pursue careers in legal academia.2 It is part of a
longstanding struggle against racial subordination in the educational sphere. Consider the history of Harvard University. Harvard
is a little over 350 years old. For two-thirds of that time, Harvard

had no black students. That should not be surprising, of course,
since the great mass of blacks in the United States were slaves until 1865, living in states in which the criminal law prohibited anyone from teaching them to read or write. Harvard did open its
doors a crack in 1850. In that year, Harvard Medical School, led by
Dean Oliver Wendell Holmes (the father of Justice Holmes) admitted three blacks. The door, however, soon shut; the medical school
ejected the blacks after only a semester because of the protests of
white medical students who objected to the blacks' presence. It
was not until 1869 that blacks graduated from any division of
Harvard University.' And it was not until 1969-a century
later-that a black academic occupied a tenured position at
Harvard.' While able white scholars attained positions of prestige
and influence at Harvard and similarly distinguished universities,
W.E.B. DuBois, Carter G. Woodson, E. Franklin Frazier, St. Clair
See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on
American Law School Faculties, 137 U Pa L Rev 537 (1988). According to Chused, "[i]n
1986-87, a typical law school faculty had thirty-one members ....

Of these ...

thirty were

white and one was black, Hispanic, or other minority." Id at 538. These figures prompt
Professor Chused to condemn the hiring record of American law schools. Id at 555. For a
more nuanced interpretation of Chused's statistics, see Stephen L. Carter, The Best Black,
and Other Tales, 1 Reconstruction 26 (1990).
' For two excellent articulations of theories animating the diversity movement, see
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,
1990 Duke L J 705; Ian Haney-Lopez, Race, Community Ties, and Faculty Hiring: The
(1991) (forthcoming).
Case for Professors Who Don't Think White, 3 Reconstruction 1 In 1869, Harvard University graduated its first black students: one from the medical
school, one from the school of dentistry, and one, George L. Ruffin, from the law school. See
Emory J. West, Harvard'sFirst Black Graduates:1865-1890, in Werner Sollors, Thomas A.
Underwood, and Caldwell Titcomb, eds, Varieties of Black Experience at Harvard 6, 10
(Harvard U Dept of Afro-American Studies, 1986).
' Martin Kilson, a political scientist, became the first tenured black professor at
Harvard University in 1969. He began his career in the Government Department at Harvard
in 1962. See Martin Kilson, Harvard and the Small Towner, in Sollors, Underwood & Titcomb, eds, Varieties of Black Experience at 156. The same year that Professor Kilson was
awarded tenure, Harvard Law School appointed Derrick Bell as lecturer, making him the
first black member of its faculty. In 1971, Bell became the first black tenured member of the
Harvard Law School faculty. See Fox Butterfield, Old Rights CampaignerLeads a Harvard
Battle, NY Times A18 (May 21, 1990).
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Drake, Ernest R. Just, and other black academics of outstanding
accomplishment were forced to make do in lesser institutions,
hemmed in by the color line.6
Efforts to break down the color line have taken many forms:
articles and books dedicated to subverting the stubborn myth that
people of color are, by virtue of their race, inferior intellectually to
whites; boycotts, sit-ins, and protest marches aimed at mobilizing
public opinion against racially discriminatory educational institutions; and legislation and litigation aimed at bringing public force
to bear against racist practices. Some of the most illustrious contributors to our democracy have been part of these efforts. Here I
think especially of Thurgood Marshall, who spent much of his career as a civil rights attorney litigating against state-supported segregated law schools.'
The diversity movement in law schools is part of this tradition
and adds a new chapter to it that is noteworthy in at least three
respects. First, the diversity movement has taken to new areas of
higher education the struggle against racial subordination. In previous periods, the struggle in law schools was largely centered upon
student admissions.' Now, at many law schools, the struggle largely
focuses upon the composition of faculties.' In other words, the diversity movement has extended the range of the insurgent tradition of which it is a part and advanced the demands of this insurgency to the most elite sphere of the educational system. It
demands diversity not only in the student body but in the professorate as well.
Second, the diversity movement has persevered and, indeed,
advanced in the face of adversity. Challenging power is always
daunting. The status quo has on its side the authority of "normalcy" and the weight of inertia. Effective activism imposes upon

See, generally, Michael Winston, Through the Back Door: Academic Racism and the
Negro Scholar in HistoricalPerspective; 100 Daedelus 678 (1971); Randall Kennedy, Racial
Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harv L Rev 1745, 1752-53 (1989).
6 See, for example, Pearson v Murray, 169 Md 478, 182 A 590 (1936) (ordering admission of Negro student to the only law school in state); Sweatt v Painter,339 US 629 (1950)
(ordering admission of Negro law student to the state's "white" law school).
7 See,
generally, Symposium: Disadvantaged Students and Legal Education-Programsfor Affirmative Action, 1970 U Toledo L Rev 277; DeFunis Symposium, 75
Colum L Rev 483 (1975); Symposium: Regents of the Univ. of California v Bakke, 67 Cal L
Rev 1 (1979).
I In the 1970s, student activists pressed for the hiring of blacks to the faculties of colleges, particularly in black studies departments. The diversity movement in legal academia
represents, in some ways, a continuation of these earlier struggles. See Kennedy, 102 Harv L
Rev at 1755.
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already demanding schedules additional tasks that must be performed in order to sustain a vibrant pressure group. The diversity
movement has largely been student-led so that organizers have had
to cope with the problem of transience, a difficulty that besets all
student-based activities. Moreover, the past decade has been a particularly difficult period for diversity activists. Twenty-five years
ago, it would have received a considerable boost from the heady
momentum generated by the Civil Rights Revolution. Now, by
contrast, the diversity movement must contend with a social environment that, particularly outside of academia, has become increasingly resistant to demands for racial justice.'
A third point about the diversity movement is that, in the face
of adversity, it has achieved important, albeit limited, successes.
The diversity movement is largely responsible for having kept the
race issue squarely on the agenda of hiring committees at the law
schools with which I am familiar. These schools are always searching for accomplished scholars or people whom they believe will develop into accomplished scholars. But they are especially attuned
to minority candidates with impressive records. At Harvard Law
School, for instance, the appointments committee does not simply
wait for applications from minority candidates. Rather, it takes the
initiative to learn about potential minority candidates who have
exhibited talents desired by the School and encourages them to
pursue careers in legal academia. The law schools at the University
of Wisconsin, Stanford, and Georgetown have created post-graduate fellowship programs devoted largely to the purpose of giving a
boost to minority students seriously considering careers in legal
academia. Responding to demands asserted by the diversity movement, the Association of American Law Schools has in recent years
insistently called attention to the paucity of racial minorities on
law school faculties and loudly urged that efforts be undertaken to
change the situation. At leading law schools, many administrators
and professors see the absence of racial minorities as an embarThat this is true outside of academia should be clear. See, for example, Thomas Byrne
Edsall with Mary D. Edsall, Race, Atlantic Monthly 53 (May 1991); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv L Rev 1327,
1341-45 (1986); Drew S. Days III, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and
Civil Rights, 19 Harv CR-CL L Rev 309 (1984). The situation within academia is more
complicated. Compare Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex
on Campus (Free Press, 1991) (arguing that demands for racial justice on campus have been
acceded to without sufficient attentiveness to competing concerns), with Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L J
431 (arguing in favor of reforms aimed at addressing a perceived resurgence of racism on
campus); Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 Va L Rev 295 (1990).
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rassment to be remedied. This is surely not a unanimous sentiment. There are undoubtedly some people in places of authority
who are, or would be, completely untroubled by the existence of an
all-white faculty. But the reformist sentiment noted above is widespread and stems, in large part, from the questioning, prodding,
and teaching that has been provided, to its great credit, by the
diversity movement.
This sentiment has helped to generate concrete results. Between 1981 and 1987, there was a 30 percent increase in the number of minorities appointed to tenured or tenure track positions on
law school faculties.10 One should be careful to avoid exaggerating
this development; the increase pushed the proportion of minority
professors in legal academia from 2.8 percent to only 3.7 percent. 1
But one should also be careful to avoid trivializing this development, for what it means is that during the period studied, racial
minorities represented 13.4 percent of the professors added to the
ranks of legal academia, a number that one close observer of these
matters has rightly termed "a very respectable figure."'"
The core aspiration of the diversity movement is morally, politically, and intellectually compelling. That aspiration is to open
law school faculties to the talents of those who have historically
been excluded on account of race and other traits around which
bigotries have gathered. The diversity movement thus demands, at
a minimum, that law schools show racial minorities equivalent care
when it comes to making judgments about their teaching and
scholarship or their future prospects as legal academics. More specifically, the diversity movement demands that minority racial status not be perceived as a disqualification or as a negative attribute
in any sense. This is an important point. Because of the tremendous, ongoing controversy over affirmative action, it is easy to believe that the only matter that divides the academic community is
competing conceptions of the appropriate means by which to remedy past invidious racial discrimination. The diversity movement
rightly insists, however, on staying alert to the possibility of discrimination against racial minorities. Because racism presently
suffuses American culture, it would be extraordinary-indeed virtually inconceivable-if legal academia were free of the scourge of
racially invidious practices."3
10

See Chused, 137 U Pa L Rev at 540 (cited in note 1).
Id at 540 n 19.

l' Carter, 1 Reconstruction at 26 (cited in note 1).
'

See Kennedy, 102 Harv L Rev at 1767 (cited in note 5).
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The diversity movement also rightly demands that in evaluating candidates for hire or promotion, law school authorities should
consider with care indicia of achievement or promise that are often
viewed as purely meritocratic but that are actually tainted by informal social practices that, on a racial basis, systematically disadvantage racial minorities. Consider, for instance, Supreme Court
clerkships. Such positions bring young attorneys to the attention
of hiring committees and typically count in their favor when hiring
decisions are made. But based on my experience and observations,'" it seems that, for reasons that are difficult to determine but
that probably have something to do with race, talented blacks encounter peculiar difficulties obtaining these coveted clerkships.
An illustration that provides at least arguable support for my
impression comes from an unlikely source: the hiring record of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Over the course of his illustrious 34year career, Justice Brennan chose approximately one hundred
clerks to help him research and write the opinions that have made
him one of the most important figures in American life since the
Second World War. Many of Justice Brennan's clerks, helped to a
considerable degree by the prestige associated with their service to
him, have gone on to lead impressive careers. Daniel J. O'Hearn is
a Justice on the New Jersey Supreme Court. Richard Posner and
Richard Arnold sit as judges on the federal courts of appeal. And
from among the Brennan clerks in academia, one could create a
fine law faculty that would include Frank Michelman of Harvard,
Owen Fiss of Yale, and Geoffrey Stone of the University of Chicago. One striking fact about Justice Brennan's extended family of
law clerks is that it includes no blacks. (In 1990, he did select a
black person, though she never had the opportunity to work with
15
him because of his sudden retirement.)
Justice Brennan's record is by no means unique. Five sitting
Justices-William Rehnquist, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter-have had no black
clerks. Justices White and Blackmun have each hired one. Justice
Stevens has hired two. Justice Marshall has hired seven, which
equals the number hired by all the other Justices in the entire his" My comments about the race question in Supreme Court clerkships are based upon
my experience as a law student seeking a clerkship, as a clerk who helped to select subsequent clerks, as a law school professor engaged in the complex process of seeking to advance
the careers of students in competition with one another, and as a law professor who has
devoted considerable time to learning about the largely unwritten history of the elite black
lawyer.
'5 See David Margolick, Law: At The Bar, NY Times B6 (Aug 24, 1990).
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tory of the Court. (Justice Frankfurter hired a black clerk in 1948,
as did Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1968.)
Some will argue that these numbers merely reflect the fact
that relatively small numbers of blacks have graduated from leading law schools with the credentials that Justices have typically
looked for in making their selections, including stellar grades, law
review membership, and glowing letters of recommendation from
figures whom the Justices respect. There is, unfortunately, much
strength in that argument." But few is not the same as none. Four
blacks selected by Justice Marshall are now on the law faculties at
Harvard and Yale. Each served as an editor of the Harvard Law
Review or the Yale Law Journal. I maintain, although I cannot
prove, that each was on par with his fellow clerks, including Justice
Brennan's, a notably distinguished bunch. Each was available to
Justice Brennan; he usually chose his clerks earlier than the other
Justices. Yet, none received offers from him.
Justice Brennan's failure to select young black lawyers, who,
as students, ascended to the highest circles of legal academia, is
both puzzling and disturbing. First, his record may reflect either
an unawareness of or apathetic response to the obstacles that black
students face, the most insidious of which is lowered expectations
on the part of their classmates and professors. It takes an extra
measure of talent, fortitude, and self-discipline for black students
to engage in all-out competition with their white peers and come
out on top. 17 When they do, persons occupying positions of author-

ity -should recognize the special quality of such accomplishment,
the fact that a black student with an "A" average has likely had to
wrestle with difficulties that his or her white colleague with an "A"
average never had to confront. 8
14 For an analysis of "the pool problem" as it relates to the crisis in faculty hiring in

academia, see Kennedy, 102 Harv L Rev at 1760-70.
" On the special difficulties that black students face in elite, predominantly white educational settings see Richard L. Zweigenhaft and G. William Domhoff, Blacks in the White
Establishment (Yale, 1991); Lorene Cary, Black Ice (Alfred A. Knopf, 1991); Jeff Howard
and Ray Hammond, Rumors of Inferiority, New Republic 17 (Sept 9, 1985); James Alan
McPherson, The Black Law Student: A Problem of Fidelities, Atlantic Monthly 93 (April
1970).
" See also DuFunis v Odegaard, 416 US 312, 331 (1974) (Douglas dissenting):
A black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into a junior college may
thereby demonstrate a level of motivation, perseverance, and ability that would
lead a fair-minded admissions committee to copclude that he shows more promise
for law study than the son of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at
Harvard. That applicant would be offered admission not because he is black, but
because as an individual he has shown he has the potential, while the Harvard
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Second, Justice Brennan's record may suggest an unawareness
of, or indifference to, the fact that some blacks who lacked some of
the credentials he typically relied upon-I think here particularly
of glowing letters of recommendation from persons he knew and
respected-were outstanding students whose abilities were
shrouded by social segregation. Black students generally find it
much more difficult than their white peers to attract the attention
and support of influential professors-most of whom, of course, are
white men. Sometimes this stems from undue defensiveness on the
part of black students who, understandably alarmed by the prevalence of racism, adopt a self-protective standoffishness. More frequently, however, it stems from the conduct of white professors
who display the familiar tendency of people to identify most with
those people who are most like them-an innocent reflex with devastating consequences for those, like blacks, in "out" groups.
Third, the virtual absence of blacks among those whom Justice Brennan hired as law clerks raises a question about his commitment to the race relations jurisprudence that forms a central
aspect of his magnificent contribution to American democracy. For
over three decades, he eloquently criticized the moral and intellectual laziness that inhibits our society from escaping the grip of its
racist past. Yet, the striking racial homogeneity of his law clerks
raises the possibility that while Justice Brennan was ever eager to
excoriate complacency "out there," he may have been lamentably
complacent in the constitution of his own judicial chambers. The
diversity movement rightly maintains that the same may be true
about the constitution of legal academia.
II
Although the diversity movement deserves praise for highlighting race problems in faculty hiring, elements within it have
supported various tendencies that need to be rethought. I shall
briefly mention two. The first is a tendency to exaggerate the significance of racial discrimination as an explanation for the paucity
of minorities on law school faculties.' Some diversity movement
activists talk as if the main, if not the only, impediment to the
hiring or promotion of minority academics is the willful, or perhaps
the unconsciously biased, opposition of the white male traditionalman may have taken less advantage of the vastly superior opportunities offered

him.

" For an elaborate discussion of this issue, see Kennedy, 102 Harv L Rev at 1765-70
(cited in note 5).
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ists. The problem with this view is that it ignores an important.
achievement of the diversity movement: the creation within many
white male traditionalists of a genuine desire to include minority
academics within law school faculties, even to the extent of modifying established patterns of recruitment and evaluation. As
should be clear from my comments above, I am not suggesting that
invidious racial discrimination can be safely dismissed as a potential explanation for disappointing results. I am suggesting, however, that diversity movement activists err to the extent that they
neglect other possibilities. When seeking to understand the relatively small numbers of racial minorities in legal academia, one
should consider the full range of variables that likely play a role in
shaping the situation that the diversity movement rightly seeks to
change. One should consider, for instance, the crippling, cyclical,
self-perpetuating effects of past discrimination (poverty, inferior
schooling, crime, and so on) that yearly consign to oblivion
thousands, indeed hundreds of thousands, of bright young people
of color who might otherwise be the Charles Lawrences or Anita
Allens of the future. One should also consider the forces that impinge upon career choices made by members of racial minorities,
including the allure of opportunities that seem more rewarding
than those offered by academia. The first of these variables may
help to explain why, among people of color, the pool of prospective
academics is so disturbingly small. The second may help to explain
why, within this small pool, so few decide to pursue academic
careers.
I realize that as a matter of argumentative strategy, there is a
practical reason for concentrating attention on conduct that one
can directly influence-that is, the decisions of one's teachers or
colleagues-as opposed to focusing upon conditions that are beyond one's immediate reach. The conduct of law professors is far
more vulnerable to protest on law school campuses than the egregious state of urban ghettoes. There are neglected costs, however,
that likely attend this strategic decision, including the allocation of
public attention to marginal as opposed to central problems, the
misimpression that legal academia is as pervasively racist as some
activists claim it to be (a misimpression that may convince some
students of color to forgo seeking academic careers), devaluation of
allegations of discrimination, and loss of goodwill from people in
authority who, despite allegations to the contrary, are genuinely
engaged in vigorous efforts to recruit scholars of color. My impression is that these and other costs often outweigh the benefits
gained by advancing exclusively claims of discrimination.

10

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1991:

A second tendency of the diversity movement that warrants
rethinking is the credentializing of race.20 One sometimes hears it
said, for instance, that racial status itself constitutes an intellectual
credential since experiences associated with minority background
create a distinctive minority "voice" that is of value to academic
communities that prize intellectual pluralism.2 1 This tack, too, has
a certain strategic value. One of the perceived disadvantages of
some of the rationales used to justify race-conscious affirmative action in faculty hiring is that they seem implicitly to concede the
scholarly inferiority of affirmative action's beneficiaries.2 2 Rationales for affirmative action that are based on notions of reparative
justice or hopes for social peace suggest that even though a given
minority scholar is less good in comparison with a white scholar,
there are overriding reasons outside the relative merits of their
intellectual work to award the position, prize, or promotion in
question to the minority scholar. Making an intellectual credential
of race lessens or removes the implication that taking race into account in hiring or promotion decisions means lowering intellectual
standards. By crediting minority racial status with a kind of intellectual virtue, some proponents of the diversity movement have
tried to enhance the prestige and marketability of minority scholars in terms of the academy's own conventional meritocratic rhetoric. They have attempted to ennoble minority status by making it
a source of intellectual authority. They have sought to glamourize
scholars of color by endowing them with a "minority mystique."
To some extent they have succeeded.
Credentializing racial status is, of course, by no means novel;
members of every group have sought to use the group's experience
as the grounds for claiming that they have special insight-a kind
of group-based knowledge-that is worthy of deference and recognition.23 And given the way that people of color have long been

10

For an elaborate discussion of this issue, see Kennedy, 102 Harv L Rev at 1788-1807.

" See, for example, Ruth Marcus, Black Law Group Supports Boycott of Harvard

Course, Washington Post A3 (Aug 18, 1982); Derrick Bell, Jr., A Question of Credentials,
Harv L Rec 6, 14 (Sept 17, 1982); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge:
Planting Seeds in Plowed Up Ground, 11 Harv Women's L J 1 (1988); Duncan Kennedy,
1990 Duke L J 705 (cited in note 2).
" See, for example, Derrick A. Bell Jr., Racism and American Law § 7.12.2 at 449
(Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed 1980): "Simply recognizing minority exceptions to traditional
admissions standards ... has served to validate and reinforce traditional values while enveloping minority applicants in a cloud of suspected incompetency."
Is See Robert K. Merton, Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of
Knowledge, 78 Am J Soc 9 (1972); Kennedy, 102 Harv L Rev at 1789-90 n 197 (discussing
claims of "insider" knowledge on the basis of Jewish identity and female identity).
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marginalized on a racial basis intellectually, one can certainly understand a desire to turn the tables.
Despite its short-term advantages, however, the diversity
movement should eschew the strategy of credentializing race. This
strategy is filled with problems, the most important of which is
that it powerfully reinforces the baneful belief that race is destiny,
that knowing a person's race can properly lead to assumptions or
conclusions about the worthiness of that person or her knowledge
or her ability to accomplish a certain task. Thus, we hear people
claim that, because of race-or more precisely, because of the firsthand experience of being oppressed as a person of color in a
predominantly white society-a black scholar will presumptively
teach a better course or write a better article about certain subjects-for example, Afro-American culture or race relations-than
a white scholar.24 Such beliefs are antithetical to what should be
fundamental precepts of academic life, and cultural life in general.
In academic life, there should be no a priori judgments made
about a person's work based merely on his or her racial background. Just as a black scholar's work on the Holocaust should be
evaluated without positive or negative prejudgment, so, too, should
a white scholar's work on African-American slavery be evaluated
without any sort of racial prejudgment. To bring to fruition such a
community, scholars and institutions will have to do all that they
can to inculcate what Gordon Allport referred to as "habitual
open-mindedness, ' 25 a skeptical attitude towards 'all labels and
categories that obscure appreciation of the unique features of specific persons and their work. Since credentializing race generates
habits of mind that lock all intellectuals, including intellectuals of
-color, into new but nonetheless confining sets of racially-classified

24 A long line of distinguished figures have made such claims. Carter G. Woodson, the
founder of the Association of Negro Lives and History, declared, for instance, that "if the
study of the Negro is ever told it must be done by scientifically trained Negroes ....
[M]en of other races cannot function efficiently because they do not think black." August
Meier and Elliot Rudwick, Black History and the Historical Profession: 1915-1980 289 (U
of Illinois Press, 1986). More recently, the Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright August Wilson
has advanced the same idea. Explaining why, in his view, only a black movie director can
suitably translate his plays to film, Wilson writes that "[w]hite directors are not qualified
for the job. The job requires someone who shares the specifics of the culture of black Americans." August Wilson, I Want a Black Director, NY Times A25 (Sept 26, 1990). For an
expression of similar views in the context of legal academia, see Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, 132 U Pa L Rev 561 (1984). For an extended rebuttal, see Kennedy, 102
Harv L Rev 1745 (cited in note 5).
18See The Nature of Prejudice 24 (Doubleday, 25th Anniversary ed 1988).
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boxes, it is a strategy that undermines rather than supports the
best aspirations of the diversity movement.
III
By insistently pushing the race question into the forefront of
discussions about legal theory, practice, and education, proponents
of the diversity movement are shining light on important issues
that had heretofore been neglected. They are also generating concrete reforms that are long overdue. Although there is much that
remains to be done, and although some parts of the diversity
movement have pursued mistaken paths, its overall influence has
been remarkably productive, an achievement that warrants respect
and invites praise.

